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ADmIRALTY-LImITATION OF LIABILITY PaOcEEDINoS-W AT LAW GOVERNS
NON-MIARITIME CLAims.-A tug negligently caused its tow to collide with
a bridge which did not provide the statutory clear passage space. The
owners of the bridge had been warned of its dangerous condition. The tug
instituted proceedings for limitation of liability for the collision to the
amount of its value under 23 STAT. 57 (1884), 46 U. S. C. § 189 (1920).
Held, inter alia, that the claim against the tug for the damage to the bridge
was subject not to the common-law rule of contributory negligence, but
rather to the admiralty rule of divided damages. United States v. Wood
Towing Corp., 1928 Am. liar. Cas. 1636 (Fed. E. D. Va. 1928).
Admiralty does not have jurisdiction over a suit for injuries done to a
bridge by a colliding vessel. Cleveland Terminal R. R. v. Cleveland S. S.
Co., 208 U. S. 316, 28 Sup. Ct. 414 (1908); see Stumberg, Tort Jursdietion
in Admiralty (1926) 4 Tmx. L. REV. 306. But it is well settled that in
limitation of liability proceedings an admiralty court can handle all
claims whether or not originally cognizable in admiralty. Richardson v.
Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 32 Sup. Ct. 27 (1911). The problem of whitt law
governs a "non-maritime" claim in such proceedings seems never to have
been raised. Since the rights of parties in tort depend on the law of the
place of the wrong rather than the law of the forum the application in
the instant case of the common-law iule as to contributory negligence would
have been orthodox in theory. See GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927)
188; 2 WHIARTON, CONFLICT OF Ltws (3d ed. 1905) 1100; ef. Long v. Atlan-
tic Coast R. R., 238 Fed. 919 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916) (rule of diminution of
damages for contributory negligence as provided by statute of state where
tort occurred applied by federal law court). The court arrived at a con-
trary conclusion on the ground that it was inequitable that of parties
mutually at fault in a collision one should be able to claim the benefit of
the rule of divided damages while the other should be subject to the con-
tributory negligence rule. See United States v. Wood Towing Corp., supra
at 1667. This "inequitable" situation already exists as a result of the
decisions establishing that in a collision of a ship and a bridge the injury
to the ship is a "maritime" tort while the injury to the bridge is not. 1
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) § 128; Cleveland Terminal R. R. v.
Cleveland S. S. Co., supra. The less technical English statutory rule that
admiralty has jurisdiction over any damage done by a ship doubtless seems
more satisfactory. 24 ViCT. c. 10, § 7 (1861); The Uhla, 2 Adm. & Ece.
29, n. (i) (1867). But so long asit is clear on the American authorities
that the claim for the damage to the bridge would have no standing in
admiralty because of lack of jurisdiction, and would be barred at law for
contributory negligence it is questionable whether the claim should be
made valid by the institution of proceedings designed to limit the financial
responsibility of shipowners. See Hartford Accident & I. Co. v. Southcrn
Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 214, 47 Sup. Ct. 357, 358 (1927).
BANKRUPTCY-PETITIONING CREDITORS--QUALIFICATION OF PREIEaRRED
CREDITOR.-The special master in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding
found that one of the three petitioning creditors had received payments
from the debtor within four months before the filing of the petition; that
these payments were not made on open account for goods sold during the
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four months' period; that they had been received without lmowledge or rea-
son to believe that the debtor was insolvent. The petitioner had not re-
turned these payments or offered to return them. The petition was dis-
missed. Held, on re-argument that this creditor was not a qualified
petitioner. Dismissal affirmed. In re Harry R. Phillips Co., 28 F. (2d)
299 (M. D. Pa. 1928).
The court relied on Carson, Pirle v. Chicago Title & Tnst Co. [1S2 U.
S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. 906 (1901)), which decided that a creditor who had
received payments from the bankrupt which amounted to a "preference"
as defined in § 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act must surrender such pay-
ments before his claim would be allowed. But the rule of that case was
changed by the amendment in 1903 to § 57 (g) which made surrender
a condition precedent to allowance only when the payments constituted
a "voidable preference" under § 60 (b). 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C.
§ 93 (g) (1926). Hence under the present Act surrender is necezzary
only when the payments were received with reasonable cause to believe
that a preference would result. In re Frazin, 201 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 2d,
1912); Peck & Co. v. Whitmer, 231 Fed. 893 (C. C. A. Sth, 1910); 2
COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 1154. The finding in the instant
case that the petitioner "did not know or have reason to believe that at
the time he received the payment the bankrupt was insolvent" should there-
fore make the claim allowable without a prior surrender. In re Faz-in,
svpra.. There would thus appear to be no basis for holding that the peti-
tioner did not qualify as a petitioning creditor since the only relevant
requirement in § 59 (b) of the Act is that he have a "provable claim."
See In re Douglass Coal & Coke Co., 131 Fed. T69, 778 (E. D. Tenn. 1904).
But cf. In re Fishblate Clothing Co., 125 Fed. 986 (E. D. N. C. 1903)
(petition dismissed on finding that one of petitioning creditor. received
payment within four months' period; not apparent whether the amendment
of 1903 was applicable). Where a petitioner has received such a preferen-
tial payment as would bar his claim without a prior surrender some of
the federal district courts have pursued the procedure of the instant case,
immediately dismissing the petition. In 'Te Burlington Malting Co., 109
Fed. 777 (E. D. Wis. 1901); In re Fishblate Clothing Co., mpra. A few
have adopted the practice of ordering such petitioners to surrender -uch
payments into court by a given date, under penalty of dismissal of the
petition. In 'e Gillette, 104 Fed. 769 (W. D. N. Y. 1900); Matter of Mur-
phy, 225 Fed. 392 (D. Mlass. 1915). Others continue with the proceedings
but do not count such petitioners toward the required number, so as to
authorize an adjudication of bankruptcy, unless the payments are re-
turned. See In re Hornstein, 122 Fed. 266, 272 (N. D. N. Y. 1903); I2 re
Macklem, 22 F. (2d) 426, 427 (D. Ald. 1927). This latter procedure is com-
mendable in that it apparently gives an opportunity to other qualified credi-
tors to join in the petition under § 59 (f) of the Act and thus to obtain
an adjudication even though the original petitioners fail to validate their
claims. Cf. Canute S. S. Co. v. Plttsburgh Coal Co., 263 U. S. 24, 44 Sup.
Ct. 67 (1923).
BANKS AND B AN KING---ATTACHZIMENT or GAnNISMAM::T OF Pnoecirs OF
DISCOUNT OF TIE AND DsmIuND ITES.-The vendor-drawer of a draft
deposited it with the payee, the I bank. The M bank forwarded the draft,
with the bill of lading attached, to the F bank for collection. The F banl:
collected the draft from the vendee-drawee. The plaintiff as creditor of
the drawer sought to garnish the proceeds of the item in the hands of the
F bank. The M bank intervened and claimed the money as owner. Held,
that the plaintiff can garnish the funds because the M bank did not puchase
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the draft but was merely an agent for collection. Merchants' Bank V.
Gallagher, 8 S. W. (2d) 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
It is well settled that where the intervening bank has "purchased" the
item it can recover as against an attachment creditor. Nat. Bank v. Brad-
ley, 264 Fed. 700 (W. D. N. Y. 1920); Merchants' Bank v. Searcy, 116
Ark. 156, 265 S. W. 961 (1924). Where the item is deposited with the bank
on which it is drawn, and credit given, it will probably be treated as a
purchase or payment. First Nat. Bank v. Sidebottom, 147 Ky. 690, 145 S. W.
404 (1912); cf. Ocean Bank v. Rogers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (1907).
This is even more likely where the item is certified. Nat. Comm. Bank v.
Miller, 77 Ala. 168 (1884). Where the depositor restrictively indorses the
item, however, it is generally held that there is an agency for collection,
,and the bank is denied recovery as against an attachment creditor. See
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 36. The doubtful case is where the de-
positor is given a checking credit by the payee bank and no other eviden-
tiary facts appear. Brown v. Yukon Nat. Bank, 138 Ark. 210, 209 S. W.
734 (1919) (purchase); Townsend Wholesale Groc. Co. V. Chamberlain,
277 S. W. 958 (Mo. App. 1926) (agency where burden of proof was on
intervening bank). Where the depositor is given an immediate credit
but the intervening bank has the option of charging back there is further
conflict. Kaplan v. Ferson Hay & Grain Co., 194 N. C. 712, 140 S. E. 617
(1927) (agency); Vickers v. Mach. Sales Co., 111 Wash. 570, 191 Pac.
869 (1920) (purchase). But in most states, when the credit has been actu-
ally drawn against, the transaction is deemed a purchase. Groveland v.
City Bank, 144 Tenn. 520, 234 S. W. 643 (1921); First Nat. Bank v.
McMillan, 15 Ga. App. 319, 83 S. E. 149 (1914). And this is so even in
those states that generally adopt the agency view and consider a charge
back inconsistent with a purchase. Lathans v. Spragins, 162 N. C. 404, 78
S. E. 282 (1913). Some states regard the drawing as giving the bank only a
lien pro tanto. Sabel v. Bank, 110 Ky. 299, 61 S. W. 367 (1901); Barton
Seed Co. v. Bank, 128 Tenn. 320, 160 S. W. 848 (1913). The charging of
interest on the credit given seems to indicate a purchase. Vickers t,.
Machinery Co., supra. Contra: Mayfield Co. v. Bank, 287 S. W. 510 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926). In the instant case the court held that a subsequent re-
duction of the draft by the bank at the drawer's request was evidence of
an agency. Contra: Dubuque Fruit Co. v. Emerson, 201 Iowa 129, 206
N. W. 672 (1926). The instant case also considered an "advise shipment,"
i. e., a shipment which could be delivered without production of the bill
of lading and without collection of the draft, as evidence of an agency for
collection. Many courts tend to favor the buyer against the intervening
bank even where the facts seem to show a purchase. Mayfield Co. v. Bank,
supra; Kaplan v. Ferson, supra. This result seems undesirable as dig-
couraging this means of facilitating sales transactions. Turner, Deposits
of Demand Paper as "Purchases" (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 874, 895.
CONTRACTS-DAmAGES FOR PROSPECTIV PROFITS-SPECULATIVE DAmAGES.
-The defendant, a motor car manufacturer, and the plaintiff entered into
a contract whereby the defendant promised not to sell any cars within a
specified area except to the plaintiff, who in turn promised to buy nine hun-
dred cars, and to sell no other make. The defendant cancelled the contract
before it had been performed completely and the plaintiff sued for loss of
profits. The complaint was dismissed. Held, on appeal, that the case be
remanded for trial since the plaintiff had a valid cause of action based on
the defendant's repudiation. The court refused to decide on the pleadings
whether there was an implied duty on the part of the defendant to sell cars
to the plaintiff, but said that the number of cars the maker would in fact
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have delivered could be ascertained with sufficient certainty to support a
verdict. Moon Motor Car Co. of N. Y. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F. (2d)
3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
That there was a breach of contract and that the plaintiff is accordingly
entitled to nominal damages is indisputable. The question raised is whether
substantial damages should be awarded. As a general rule, uncertain or
speculative damages are not recoverable. SEDivICIC, Erxrmh's OP LAW oP
DASIAGES (2d ed. 1909) c. II, 24. But where there was a detention of the
plaintiff's vessel and interference with its sealing voyages, the plaintiff was
held entitled to recover from the United States the value of the probable
catch. Whitelaw v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 103 (N. D. Cal. 1925). And
-where the defendant failed to drill and complete an oil well as agreed, dam-
ages for the loss of prospective profits from the probable oil production
were awarded. Julian Petrol. Carp v. Courtney Petrol. Co., 22 F. (2d) 360
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927); cf. Fort Smith & W. Ry. v. Williams, 30 01da.
726, 121 Pac. 275 (1912). Profits were considered purely speculative, how-
ever, where a bank breached a contract to loan a grain dealer money with
which to pay -for corn purchased and the latter was thereby compelled to
make a forced sale, the plaintiff being denied recovery of a profit which he
might have made by reason of an advance in the market. Farabee-Tread-
well Co. v Union Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 18G S. W. 92 (1916).
And for a like reason, where the plaintiff sued on a contract to furnish a
theatre it was held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for loz3 of
prospective profits. K. & R. Film Co. v. Brady, 104 Misc. 67, 172 N. Y.
Supp. 268 (Sup. Ct. 1918); cf. DeHoncy *v. Giarde, 134 Wash. 647, 236 Pac.
290 (1925); Note (1928) 28 COL. LAw REav. 76. Damages are -sentially
a matter of proof. The cases indicate that if the data as to loss of profits
resulting from a breach of contract is such that a jury might come to a
rational conclusion, damages therefor may be recovered. The instant case
is an extension in that the number of orders the defendant would have filled
was optional with him. But as the plaintiff was, by the contract, the sole
conduit for the marketing of the defendant's product in that community,
economic pressure and the desire for profit would probably force the defend-
ant to fill all orders. Cf. Bkby-Thisc-n Co. v. Evans, 174 Ala. 571, 57 So.
39 (1911) (contract for delivery of unspecified number of logs; defendant
not bound to supply the plaintiff exclusively; damages held unascertainable
and speculative). Furthermore, the number of cars that the plaintiff would
have sold could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. The decision in
the instant case would therefore seem unquestionably sound.
CORPORATIONS-EFFECT o CnHr rm PRovIsIoNs UPON SHAmnEOLmzrS'
PRIVILEGE TO INSEcT CORPORATE Booxs.-The defendant corporation denied
to a shareholder the privilege of examining any of its boolk except the
stock ledger. A statute expressly authorized inspection of the latter. In
defense to a petition for a writ of mandamus, the corporation set up a
provision of its certificate of incorporation which gave to the board of
directors the power to determine wheii and if the books and records should
be opened for examination. Held, that this clause is ineffective to destroy
the shareholder's common-law privilege of inspection. State V. Pcn-Bcavcr
Oil Co., 143 Atl. 257 (Del. 1926).
At common law a shareholder is privileged to inspect the corporate books
and records upon showing a "proper purpose germane to his interest as a
stockholder." BALLANTNE, CORPORATIONS (1927) 545. Statutes e:prezsly
permitting inspection have been construed as enlarging the common-law
privilege. Knoz v. Coburn, 117 Ale. 409, 104 Atl. 789 (1918) (burden of
proving improper motive placed on corporation); Vcnncr v'. Chicago Ry.,
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246 Ill. 170, 92 N. E. 643 (1910) (motive immaterial). Contra: O'Hara v.
Nat. Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. 198, 54 Atl. 241 (1903). But mandamus has
often been refused under such statutes when an improper motive appeared,
on the ground that a change in the discretionary character of the remedy
was not intended. State v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 At]. 773
(1922); (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 590. When the statute specifically covers
only certain books, the privilege to inspect the other books and records
remains as at common law. Matter of Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 X. E.
1103 (1899); Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423, 219 S. W. 191
(1920). Provisions for inspection in the by-laws of a corporation have
been construed to operate like similar statutory provisions. State '. Buck-
l/n, 83 Wash. 23, 145 Pac. 58 (1914) (motive immaterial); Wyoming Coal
Mining Co. v. State, 15 Wyo. 97, 87 Pac. 337 (1906) (dispensing with
necessity of alleging mismanagement). But a by-law denying the common-
law or statutory privilege to inspect is invalid. State W. Jessup & Moore
Paper Co., 1 Boyce 379, 77 Atl. 16 (Del. 1910); Klotz v. Pan-Amcrcan
Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N. E. 764 (1915). And the fact that the
petitioning shareholder has voted for it is immaterial. Conmonwealth 1).
Penn Silk Co., 267 Pa. 331, 110 Atl. 157 (1920). A charter provision vest-
ing "all powers of'the corporation" in the board of directors has been held
not incompatible with the individual shareholder's privilege of inspection.
State v. Bienville Oil Works Co., 28 La. Ann. 204 (1876). The instant case,
which refused to permit the destruction of this privilege by stipulation In
the certificate of incorporation, finds support in the holding that the statu-
tory power of a court to order the books to be brought into the state for
examination by a shareholder was not abrogated by a similar clause.
Hodgens v. United Copper Co., 67 Atl. 756 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1907); of. State
v. Stearns Tire & Tube Co., 202 S. W. 459 (Mo. App. 1918). The advent
of widespread absentee ownership has left the shareholders with but a
modicum of control over corporate directors and affairs. Seligman, Broader
Legal Aspects of Customer Stock Ownership (1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 851.
Plans for an increase in their control through adequate publicity and the
introduction of a shareholders' "audit and general check-up committee" have
been vigorously presented. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).
Until such plans are proved either feasible or desirable, the privilege of
inspection, even though it may be of limited utility in practice, remains the
shareholders' most effective means of discovering fraud or mismanagement.
CORPORATIONS-RECOVERY BY CREDITORS OF DIVIDENDS PAID TO SIIARE-
HOLDERS.-The bill, in an ancillary receiver's suit to recover dividends from
shareholders, alleged insolvency of the corporation at the time of the divi-
ddnd payments. The allegation failed to state, however, whether the credi-
tors represented by the receiver became such prior or subsequent to the
payments. The lower court dismissed the bill. Held, on appeal, that the
bill was insufficient on its face. Decree affirmed. Wood v. National City
Bank, 24 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
When dividends are paid in good faith at a time when a corporation is
solvent, and its capital stock is not impaired, creditors cannot recover them
from shareholders when the corporation subsequently becomes unexpectedly
insolvent. Reid v. Eatonton Mfg. Co., 40 Ga. 98 (1869) (creditors' suit
for appointment of receiver to recover dividends from shareholders). If,
when the dividends are paid to shareholders, the corporation is solvent but
the capital stock is impaired, some courts will allow both prior and sub-
sequent creditors to recover. Williams v. Boice, 38 N. J. Eq. 364 (1884)
(receiver of insolvent bank against shareholders); Cottrell V. Albany Card
& Paper Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 148, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (3d Dep't 1911)
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(trustee in bankruptcy against sole shareholder); 2 CooK, ConrnATIo:.s
(Sth ed. 1923) 1914, n. 3. But recovery may be denied where the sAare-
holder received the dividend in good faith without notice of the impairment.
McDonald v. Williamis, 174 U. S. 397, 19 Sup. Ct. 743 (1899) (rccciver of
insolvent bank against shareholder); Carlisle v,. Ottlcy, 143 Ga. 797, 85
S. E. 1010 (1915) (trustee in bankruptcy against shareholder). And some-
times it is insisted that the creditor, in order to recover, be in existnee
prior to the dividend payment. 2 Mor,wnz, PRrvAkn COnrOrATIONS (2d cd.
1886) § 800; see Ratcliff v. Clendenn, 232 Fed. 61, 64 (C. C. A. Sth, 1016)
(trustee in bankruptcy against shareholder); Afontgomacry v. Wkitehcad,
40 Colo. 320, 327, 90 Pac. 509, 511 (1907) (judgment creditors against
shareholders). Where an insolvent corporation pays dividends to share-
holders, there is scant authority as to 'whether a distinction will be made
between prior and subsequent creditors. See Ratcliff v. Ckndenia, upra
at 64 (dictum that only prior creditors could recover); cf. Hct,'dca v.
Williams, 96 Fed. 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899) (recovery of dividends from
shareholders without mentioning whether creditors vwere prior or subz-
quent). The distinction, which appears to be clearly made for the first
time in the instant case, seems sound.
CRIMINAL LAW-PER uRy AS CONTEMPT OF CouRT.-The defendant .'as
charged with violation of an injunction prohibiting the maintenance of a
nuisance in a building where intoxicating liquors 'were illegally sold. He
produced a written document purporting to be a lease of the building to a
third party. It was proved that the lease was false the lezzee named
therein fictitious, and that the defendant had induced a witness to testify
falsely as to both points. Held, that the defendant 'was guilty of direct
contempt of court. United States v. Kanzs, 27 F. (2d) 453 (N. D. Oda.
192S).
Prevarication by a witness under oath constitutes a contempt of court.
1 CHAnmERw.YNE, EVME*Ncr (1911) § 249; 4 BL. Commr'i. "2M. The pre-
sentation of fabricated evidence may be punished likewise. Cidcago Direc-
tory Co. v. United States Directory Go., 123 Fed. 194 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1903). The inducement of false testimony is also a contempt. Rictfott v.
State, 111 Tenn. 380, 77 S. W. 1076 (1903). Such false testimony need not
constitute perjury. Young v. State, 19S Ind. 629, 154 N. E. 478 (1926).
But the crime of perjury does not exclude punishment for contempt, for in
theory there are two offenses, one against the state and one against the
court. Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N. J. Eq. 546, 100 At. 608 (1917);
Miele v. Acicrno, 122 Blisc. 872, 202 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct 1924);
cf. People v. Valcourt, 18 P. R. 471 (1912). Contra: State v. Lazaru.s,
37 La. Ann. 314 (1885). Either certainty of the falsity of the testimony,
or admission of its falsity by the accused, is indispensable to the exercise
of this power. People v. Hille, 192 Ill. App. 139 (1915) ; Rily aV. Wallace,
188 Ry. 471, 222 S. W. 10S5 (1920); Hcgelaw v. State, 24 Ohio App. 103,
155 N. E. 6"20 (1927). And, when the facts are in dispute, it has been said
that the offender should be left to criminal prosecution. See Edwards v.
Edwards, supra, at 548, 100 At. at 609. The rule that a contempt could
be purged by a 'written denial of the contempt, under oath, no longer pre-
vails in most jurisdictions. Eykelboom v. People, 71 Colo. 318, 200 Pac. 83
(1922); cf. Curtis and Curtis, The Story of a Notion in the Law of Criut-
inal Contempt (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 51. Contra: People -e. Rickman,
222 fI. App. 147 (1921). The objection has been made that the power to
punish such an offense should not be left to a judge without a jury. Stae v.
Lazarus, supra; Lerch's Contestcd Election, 21 Pa. Dist. 1113 (1912)
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(power might be used to intimidate witnesses). The immediate deten-
tion of the accused has been attacked as a deprivation of a hearing.
People v. Berrell, 216 Ill. App. 341 (1920). Such commitment in the
presence of the jury has been regarded as an invasion of the rights of the
party offering the witness. State v. Swinl, 151 N. C. 726, 66 S. E. 448
(1909). And as an intimation of opinion by the judge, contrary to statute.
Burke v. State, 66 Ga. 157 (1880). But the crime of perjury has been
emasculated by technicalities, and convictions are difficult. King, Perjury
in Illinois (1923). 17 ILL. L. REv. 596. It is submitted that the social neces-
sity of a deterrent decidedly overbalances these objections to the punishment
of perjury as contempt.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-VOID DECREE OF DiSTRIBUTION-P.E-
SPONSBILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR,-The petitioner, as administrator of an
estate without debts, paid the residue into court in good faith in accordance
with a decree'of distribution. A receipt was given, but the decree was not
recorded, nor could the disposition of the fund be traced. The succeeding
judge, upon re-examining the account, decreed that the petitioner pay the
sum to the town of which the intestate had been a resident, refusing to
record the former decree on the ground that it was void as in excess of the
court's statutory jurisdiction. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the recording of the former decree and a writ of prohibition
against suit by the town. Held, petition dismissed. Barber v. Chase, 143
Atl. 302 (Vt. 1928).
A void judgment is a nullity. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925)
§ 322; Note (1893) 21 L. R. A. 146. Although the resulting hardship is
principally the fault of the courts, the litigants to some extent share the
responsibility, for they control the advance and prosecution of any suit.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) §§ 3; 4. This is particularly true in cases
of probate jurisdiction, which is largely statutory. Had the court in the
instant case had jurisdiction, the failure of the administrator to comply
with the decree would have subjected him to contempt proceedings. In To
Isaac's Estate, 103 Misc. 184, 169 N. Y. Supp. 1066 (Surr. Ct. 1918). But
he might have appealed from the decree, before performing. In To Forney's
Estate, 44 Nev. 279, 194 Pac. 331 (1921). His negligence was slight beside
that of the judge, and it would seem that he should recover from the latter,
who, under the void decree, took the residue and left no trace of it.
Cf. Austin Ry. v. Faust, 133 S. W. 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Adamson W.
Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 (1827). The negligent omission to perform or the im-
proper discharge by a public officer, of a ministerial, as distinguished from
a. judicial, duty, renders him responsible in damages to the injured party.
Wright v. Shanahan, 149 N. Y. 495, 44 N. E. 74 (1896); (1920) 34 HARv.
L. REV. 219. The duty in the instant ease was to pay over the funds to the
town where the intestate had lived, apparently a ministerial act. VT. GEN.
LAWS (1917). §§ 3420-3422; cf. Cornelison v. Million, 124 S. W. 366 (Ky.
1910). Furthermore, recovery might be allowed on the theory that the
petitioner, by paying the town, becomes subrogated to its right of recovery
from the judge. See 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1919) § 2345.
The situation is analogous to that where restitution is granted to one who
in the discharge of his own legal obligations has performed a duty which,
as between himself and the other, rested in equity and good conscience
upon the latter. WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) § 252.
FRAUD-PRomISSORY MISREPRENTATION-CONTRACT WITH INTENT NOT TO
PERFORM.The defendant, undisclosed principal, made a contract through
his agent for the purchase in installments of the plaintiff's entire holdingg
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in a corporation over which the defendant wished to gain control. The
contract provided for a comparatively small sum as liquidated damages in
event of default. The defendant's purpose was to pay liquidated damages
after he had taken only a small part of the plaintiff's holdings, which, added
to his own, would give him control. This he did. The plaintiff, on learning
the facts twenty-three years later, sued for specific performance. That
remedy having become impracticable, substantial damages were given in
lieu thereof, above the liquidated damages theretofore paid under the con-
tract. Held, on appeal, by a divided court, that the defendant's conceal-
ment of his intention was an actionable fraud. Judgment affirmed. Fidelity
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Simpson, 143 Atl. 202 (Pa. 1928).
A misrepresentation of intention is a misrepresentation of fact sufficient
to constitute actionable fraud. Swift 'v. Rounds, 19 R. L 527, 35 Atl. 45
(1896); Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Blass. 480, 150 N. E. 329 (1926).
Contra: Kitson v. Farzwell, 132 Ill. 327, 23 N. E. 1024 (1890). This mis-
representation may consist in a promise made with the intention of not
performing it. Rogers v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 149 Fed. 1 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1906); Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459 (1882); Burdich,
Deceit by False Statement of Intent (1918) 3 So. L. Q. 118; 3 WILusror1,
CoNTRAcTs (1920) §§ 1496, 1521. But cf. Dennis, Notes oz a Diputed
Point in the Lazo of Deceit (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 287. It would seem that
one making a contract is bound primarily to perform the promised act,
the duty to pay damages being secondary. See Corbin, Prc-czitirg Duty
as a Consideration (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 362, 363; Note (1917) 16 Blicar.
L. REv. 106, 108. But the theory has been advanced that the promisor
undertakes alternative duties, i. e., to perform or pay damages. See Fjc
v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 374 (1907); Holmes, The Path of the Law (1397)
10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462; Note (1916) 14 MiCH. L. Rmv. 480, 482. On
this theory it could logically be argued that a party to a contract, in maling
a promise, is not necessarily to be taken as representing that he intends
to perform it. No implication as to his intention results from a liquidated
damage clause, such a clause being merely a provision to ascertain in ad-
vance the damages to be paid on breach, and no more a representation of
intention to pay damages than the mere act of entering into a contract.
But that act seems more plausibly to imply a representation of intention
to perform than of alternative intention either to perform or to pay dam-
ages. And however that may be, it is not natural to suppose that a man
contracts with a deliberate original intention to pay damages after part
performance. Cf. HOLImES, THE CamgoN LAW (1881) 302. In the instant
case it is clear that the plaintiff would have refused to contract had he even
suspected that such was the defendant's intention, and the defendant ]mew
it. The holding by the majority of the court that the defendant's conduct
amounted to wilful misrepresentation of a material fact seems justifiable.
HABEAS CORPUS-STRMES--SUSnNSlON.-The governor of Colorado called
out the militia to restore order among strikers, leaving the means to be
employed to the discretion of an officer. The latter arrested the plaintiffs
and refused to surrender them to the civil authorities. The plaintiffs
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the writ be granted and
the prisoners discharged. United States v. Adams, 26 F. (2d) 141 (D.
Colo. 1928).
The governor may use the militia to restore order, and his judgment that
such use is justified is final. United States v. Fischcr, 2S0 Fed. 208 (D. Neb.
1922). In situations similar to that of the instant case, the courts of West
Virginia, Colorado, Idaho and Pennsylvania have gone far in denying re-
course to habeas corpus proceedings. Nance & Mays v. Brown,4 71 W. Va.
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519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912) (petitioner arrested outside of, and taken within,
area of disorder, and there sentenced by military court; disorder held to
suspend the constitutional right); In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pat. 100
(1904) (dspite provision in Bill of Rights that military shall always be
subordinate to the civil authorities, petitioner arrested by military authori-
ties denied writ) ; In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899) (petitioner
confined by militia; governor had power to suspend writ); of. Common-
wealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952, 65 L. R. A. 193 (1903). The
constitutional objection to the governor's power to suspend the writ has
been avoided by holding that if the governor has suspended the writ, al-
though not privileged to do so, the courts will not interfere during the
disorder. Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802 (1870). Federal circuit courts
have held that the President of the United States does not have authority'
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or its privilege without authorization
by Congress. Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (C. C. D. Md. 1861)
(Chief Justice Taney); Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530 (La. 1815); see
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch. 75, 101 (U. S. 1807) ; BINNE:Y, THE PRivzIa2 a
OF THE WRIT (1862). Contra: Ex parte Field, Fed. Cas. No. 4761 (C. C,
D. Vt. 1862); 10 OP. ATnY GEN. 74 (Bates 1861). The economic situation
in the four above named states suggests that their extreme position is not
necessarily indicative of the course other jurisdictions would take if faced
with the problem. It is submitted that the instant case subscribes to the
better view, that the writ should be sustained, even where the militia are
used, so long as the judicial authorities function. Cf. Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray
121 (Mass. 1855); Christian County v. Mertigan, 191 Ill. 484, 61 N. E. 479
(1901).
INSURANCE-VAIVER-REINSTATEMIENT OF POLICY BY ACCEPTANCE OV A
LATE Pn irum.-The defendant insurance company received and cashed a
check for an overdue premium on the insured's life policy, and promptly
wrote the insured that the policy would be reinstated only upon receipt of
a certificate of good health. Although the delivery of this letter was not
proved, the insured was too ill to have taken cognizance of it had it arrived.
The insured died shortly after and the beneficiary recovered on the policy.
Held, on appeal, that the cashing of the check constituted an unconditional
acceptance of the premium and a reinstatement of the policy, since the
insured never knew of the conditions imposed. Judgment affirmed. Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc. v. Brewer, 9 S. W. (2d) 206 (Ky. 1928).
It is well settled that forfeiture of a policy for breach of conditions may
be waived by words or acts signifying the insurer's intent not to require
a strict compliance with the term of the contract. Aetna Insuranco Co. -,.
Daggett, 5 S. W. (2d) 719 (Ark. 1928); see Rundell v. Anchor Insurance
Co., 128 Iowa 575, 577, 105 N. W. 112 (1905). Thus the unconditional
acceptance of the late premium waives the insurer's power of forfeiture.
Arrington v. Continental Life Insurance Co., 193 N. C. 344, 137 S. E. 137
(1927); see Sheav. Mass. Benefit Ass'n, 160 Mass. 289, 294, 35 N. E. 855,
856 (1894). But as there is no duty to accept a late premium, the insurer
may impose any conditions it chooses. See Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n
v. Tuehfeld, 159 Fed. 833, 840 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908). A conditional accept-
ance does not amount to a waiver while the conditions are unfulfilled.
Clifton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 N. C. 499, 84 S. E. 817 (1915) (accept-
ance conditional on certificate of good health) ; Ronald v. Mutual Rcscrvo
Fund Life Ass'n, 132 N. Y. 378, 30 N. E. 739 (1892). But of. Wilson v.
Illinois Life Ins. Co., 300 S. W. 550 (Mo. 1927) (premium retained two
months after insured failed to reply to notification of conditional accept-
ance). But an insurer's failure to notify the insured of the conditions on
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which the premium is accepted operates as a waiver. MeQuillan v. Mfutual
Reserve Fund Lkfe Ass'n, 112 Wis. 665, S7 N. W. 1069, 50 L. M. A. 23
(1902); Shea v. Mass. Benefit Ass'n, szvpra. When, however, the failure
is due to the insured's death or incapacity the conditions have been held
to apply. Miles v. M.tzal Reserve Fa'nd Life Ass'n, 103 Wis. 421, S-
N. W. 159 (1901); Rogcrs v. Columbian Nat. Life In.. Co., 21"
N. W. 757 (Iowa 1927). In the instant case the defendant's conditional
receipt negatives any intent unconditionally to waive forfeiture of the
policy, and since the insured could not have fulfilled the conditions he was
not prejudiced even in the absence of notice of them. Hence it would seem
that the conditions might well have been held to apply unless the cazhing
of the check, of itself, amounted to an unconditional acceptance of the late
premium. The cashing of a check given in full payment of a disputed
amount has been held to be such acceptance. Fullcr -e. Kcnzp, 13S N. Y.
231, 33 N. E. 1034 (1893). In the instant case, however, the insured was
dearly not entitled to reinstatement except on the insurer's conditionz.
There could therefore be no reasonable dispute as to the terms on which
the late premium was submitted. The court would seem to have attached
exaggerated importance to an insignificant detail, occurring in the natural
conduct of business.
LIIAITATION oF AcTioNS-ESoPPL IN PMs.-The plaintiff had a cause
of action for negligent injury against the defendant railroad. In the e:-
pectation of an amicable settlement, the parties negotiated for nineteen
months, when the defendant requested an interview with the plaintiff's
physicians. Five months later, two days before the expiration of the statu-
tory period, the defendant offered to settle for a smaller sum. The defend-
ant knew of the limitation and had reason to know that the plaintiff did
not. The plaintiff accepted after the expiration of the period, but the
defendant refused to pay, and set up the statute of limitations as a bar
to the plaintiff's action at law. The plaintiff then sued in equity to enjoin
the plea. Held, that the defendant was estopped to plead the statute of
limitations. Injunction issued. Howard v. West Jcrsey and S. S. R., 1,11
A1l. 755 (N. J. Ch. 1928).
Estoppel to plead the statute of limitations is not recognized as a defcnse
in an action at law in New Jersey. Ftrcian v. Conorcr, 95 N. J. L. 09,
112 Atl. 324 (1920). The proper remedy is to secure an injunction in
equity. Clark v. Augustine, 62 N. J. Eq. 6S9, 51 At. 63 (1902). In code
states such estoppel may be pleaded in any cause of action. Livcr maor
Falls Trist & Banking Co. v. Riley, 103 Ble. 17, 78 Atl. 920 (1911) ; Japz-c
v. Kane, 140 Va. 27, 124 S. E. 247 (1924) ; Note (192G) 24 AIcu. L. fv.
287. The United States Supreme Court seems to recognize no such estoppl,
even when there is a bill in equity to enjoin the plea. Avdrcae -v. Rcd-cl4h,
98 U. S. 225 (1878). But cf. Thoiapson '. Phcunf I2. Co., 130 U. S. 2&7,
10 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1890) (suit in equity to reform an insurance policy where
the holding out of a hope of an amicable settlement was held to be an
"estoppel" by "waiver" of a limitation clause in the policy). It will, how-
ever, give effect to a promise not to plead the statute in comIderation of
forbearance. Schroeder v. Yo ng, 161 U. S. 334, 16 Sup. Ct. 512 (1396).
The New York courts, on grounds of public policy, will not enforce a
promise not to plead the statute. Shaplcy 'v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 4,13 (1870);
Muttal Life Ins. Co. v. UniteJ States Hotel Go., 32 Misc. 632, 144 N. Y.
Supp. 476 (Sup. Ct. 1913). But cf. Watcrtoun Bank. -. Bagicy, 1" App.
Div. 831, 119 N. Y. Supp. 592 (4th Dep't 1909). But they do permit a
misrepresentation of fact to work an estoppel. Clarke v. Ginourc, 149 App.
Div. 445, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1047 (1st Dep't 1912); In To De Frccst'c Will,
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120 Misc. 653, 200 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Surr. Ct. 1923). But of. Tulloch °.
Hasele, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926) (limited
to cases where suit is based upon fraud). An agreement to arbitrate has
been held to estop one from pleading limitations. Empire Gas and Fuel
Co. v. Lindersmith, 268 Pac. 218 (Okla. 1928). It is asserted that a mis-
representation of law will not estop the plea. Robbins v. Law, 48 Cal. App.
555, 192 Pac. 118 (1920); Dean v. A. G. McAdams Lumber Co., 172 S. W.
762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). But the failure of a defendant to inform the
plaintiff of the improper execution of a note when the former know that
the plaintiff believed it valid created an estoppel. Lange r. Binz, 281 S. W.
626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). The instant case exemplifies a growing tend-
ency to protect one relying on misleading conduct. Cf. Bakers-Matthows
Co. v. Grayling Lumber Co., 134 Ark. 351, 203 S. W. 1021 (1918).
1
PLEADING-SUMIARY JUDGMENT-LAW AND FACT.-In an action on a
note, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, alleging that the note had
been transferred "for value received" and "without notice," The defendant's
opposing affidavit stated that the plaintiff had taken "with knowledge" of
the defense, between the original parties. Held, that the motion be granted,
the defendant's contention being a "mere conclusion." Galnsha Stove Co.
v. Pivnicek Constr. Co., 132 Misc. 875, 230 N. Y. Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
The New York Code provides that the pleader shall state the "material
facts" and not the evidence. N. Y. C. P. A. § 241; Sherman v. Int'l Pub.,
214 App. Div. 437, 212 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1925) (evidentiary
matter which could not be proved by competent evidence stricken out);
Pres. of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 199 App. Div. 767, 192 N. Y. Supp. 239
(1st Dep't 1922) (allegation that plaintiff was lawful owner and holder
upheld as proper ultimate fact); Reicher v. Trade Bank, 124 Misc. 166,
207 N. Y. Supp. 178 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The illusory nature of the distinction
between "conclusion of law," "evidentiary fact" and "ultimate fact" has
received comment. CLARK, CODE PLFADING (1928) 150; see Cook, State-
ments of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV. 416,
417 (adversely criticizing Pomeroy's statement that the allegation must be
of "dry, naked, actual facts"); Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 483, 484;
of. Ponoy, CODE REuED S (4th ed. 1904) 560, 561. The distinction has
been applied by the courts in reviewing moving affidavits in applications
for summary judgment. But here the decisions have penalized allegations
of "ultimate fact" and "conclusions of law," the courts uniformly insisting
on "evidentiary facts." Sher v. Rodkin, 198 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct.
1923); Kellogg v. Berkshire Bldg. Corp., 125 Misc. 818, 211 N. Y. Supp.
623 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Reynolds v. Fahey, 4 Penn. 264 (Del. 1903); King v'.
Curtin, 31 App. D. C. 23 (1908). The nature of the summary judgment
proceedings may well require a more detailed account of the fact trans-
action than is requisite for the usual pleadings. Cf. Webster v. Polavin,
241 Mich. 19, 216 N. W. 430 (1927); Sehaffer Stores Co. v. Sweet, 132
Misc. 38, 228 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1928). The quantum of evidence
necessary for the proper disposition Pf a motion for summary judgment
would seem to be a matter for the exercise of the court's discretion, the
determination of which can hardly be said to turn on an illusory distinction
between "evidentiary facts" and "conclusions of law."
RECEIVERS-PPIORIy OP CERTM'FCATES.-Bondholders of a private cor-
poration consented that a receiver be appointed to continue the business,
Receiver's certificates issued on four different dates were ordered by the
court to be a first lien on all funds received from operation of the plant,
and on assets not subject to existing liens. In the winding up proceedings
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supply creditors of the receiver were preferred to certificate holders. Held,
on appeal, that all certificates should have priority, two judges dissnt ing
in part on the ground that the supply creditors had an equitable lien that
could not be subordinated to subsequent issues of certificates. Ccntral
Trust Co. of Md. v. American Foundry & Mfg. Co., 141 Atl. 111 (lDId. 1028).
It is usually held that if a court of equity orders the issue of first lien
receiver's certificates to continue the business of a private corporation
without consent of contract lHenholders, such certificates will be subordi-
nated to the contract liens. Amierean Ergizecring Co. v,. Metropolitan By-
Products Co., 275 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; Frcewman Y. Craft, 294 S. WN.
822 (Ky. 1927). But in the case of railroads and other public utilities the
court may continue their operation by the issue of certificates which, if eo
ordered, will be given priority over all prior liens. Union Tn, t Co. v.
Ill. Midland Ry., 117 U. S. 434, 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 809, 820 (1886); Central
Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh S. & N. R. R., 223 N. Y. 347, 119 N. E. 5G5 (1918) ;
cf. McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 841 (1018).
Such lienholders may be accorded their contract priority where the court
clearly has abused its discretion in ordering an.improvident issue of cer-
tificates. Ford v. Van Valkenberg, 228 S. W. 194 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921)
(one of two light plants in town not large enough to justify operation of
both). Supply creditors of the receiver of a private corporation and holders
of a second issue of certificates, not declared in the court order to be a first
lien, share alike. In re Cornell Co., 201 Fed. 381 (S. D. N. Y. 1912). It
has been held that claims for car service rendered to the receiver of a
railway and damage claims of shippers should share alike with holders
of certificates ordered to be a first lien. Jeffers "v. N. J. & Penn. Ry., S N.
J. Eq. 68, 97 Atl. 32 (1916). For the reason that the "current debt fund"
has been improperly diverted for the benefit of mortgagees, supply claims
against railroads arising within six months prior to receivership are given
priority in equity over mortgage liens. Fosdick ,. Sciall, 99 U. S. 235
(1878). And similar debts incurred by the receiver have been given the
same priority. Southern Railway Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257,
20 Sup. Ct. 347 (1900). Following that doctrine, the Maryland court had
held that one who supplied coal to a public refrigerating and heating cor-
poration immediately prior to the receivership had an equitable lien, which
should be given priority over unsecured creditors of the corporation. Hwzcr
v. Baltimore Refrigerating & Heating Go., 117 Md. 411, 84 Atl. 170
(1912). The dissenting judges in the instant case considered that upon
the authority of that case the supply claimants were lien creditors whose
claims could not be deferred without their consent. The majority distin-
guished it upon the ground that this was not true of a "wholly private"
corporation. The distinction seems rather tenuous, but it is perhaps de-
sirable that such creditors of the receiver should not be given that status.
The marketability of certificates is usually necessary to the successful
administration of the property by the court. When it decrees that certif-
icates shall have priority, good faith requires that its promise be kept. See
Kneeland v. Luce, 141 U. S. 491, 508, 12 Sup. Ct. 32, 38 (1891).
TAx oN-EvASION BY IENUNCIATION OF EEcuTonY Dvxs.--The tez-
tator devised his estate to his wife for life and then to his Eon, the defend-
ant, but if the latter predeceased the former, then to A on the death of
the wife. Since A was a stranger to the testator, his contingent interest w as
subject to a high rate of inheritance tax. To avoid such a tax, A re-
nounced, by a written instrument filed in the probate court, all interest
which he might receive in the estate of the deceased. The state proceeded
against the defendant and the executrix for the tax. The lower court held
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that the high tax rate could not be avoided by such renunciation. Held,
on appeal, that the renunciation was lawful and the fact that it was in-
tended merely to evade payment of the tax was immaterial. Judgment
reversed. People v. Flanagin, 162 N. E. 848 (Ill. 1928).
Taxes may be lawfully avoided if the means adopted do not constitute
"bad faith" or "fraud." United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496 (U. S. 1873) ;
Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed. 155 (N. D. Tex. 1920).; City of Louisville v.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 166 Ky. 104, 178 S. W. 1168 (1915); Sears,
Effective and Lawful Avoidance of Taxes (1921) 8 VA. L. REV. 7. Thus,
a change of domicil for the purpose of diminishing taxes is not illegal, and
cuts off the power to tax at the first domicil. Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass.
53 (1878) ; Rodgers v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434, 32 N. E. 691 (1892) ; JUDSON,
TAXATION (2d ed. 1917) § 478; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 470.
But ef. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 149 Ky. 516, 149 S. W.
875 (1912) (change must not be fictional). Taxation cannot be avoided by
a device which is in itself unlawful or a mere subterfuge or artifice. Lappin
and Scrofford v. Commissioners of Nemaha County, 6 Kan. 403 (1870)
(concealment of mortgage to evade taxation); People v. Sawyer, 27 N. Y.
Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (assignment of bonds and mortgages without
consideration to a non-resident to avoid a tax) ; Ransom v. City of Burling-
ton, 111 Iowa 77, 82 N. W. 427 (1900) (conveyance of fifteen-foot strip
of a large tract of land abutting on street, to avoid paving assessment);
Montgomery v. Marshall County, 129 N. W. 329 (Iowa 1911) (colorable
change of contract into option to avoid taxation). Such attempted avoid-
ance is more readily ascertainable where the change is of a temporary
character. Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, 9 Sup. Ct. 362 (1889);
Durham v. State, 6 Ind. App. 23, 32 N. E. 104 (1892). To prevent tax
evasion, the statutes of many states provide for the taxation of property
transferred in contemplation of death. OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)
§§ 5931, 5332; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1928) c. 61, § 248 (g);
Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Parker, 117 Ohio St. 215, 158 N. E. 89 (1927) ;
Estate of Pauson, 186 Cal. 358, 199 Pac. 331 (1921). Statutes also impose
a tax on transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment" at
or after the trustor's death. ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 120, § 396;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 65, § 1; People v. McCormick, 158 N. E. 861
(Ill. 1927); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 833. These apply, a fortiori, where the
donor has reserved to himself the income for life. Saltonstall v. Treas. &
Rec'r Gen., 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E. 4 (1926); (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 329. These statutes may be justified on the ground that the bene-
ficiary has actually received a benefit. But in the instant case, there was
a bona fide disclaimer of all benefits under the devise. Of. SEAS, op. cit.
supra at 84. Such disclaimer is within the power and privilege of a de-
visee. Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314, 213 N. W. 608 (1927); Greely v.
Houston, 148 Miss. 799, 114 So. 740 (1927).
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CANCELLATION OF Assumxnn TAX LIEN.-The
plaintiff contracted to sell a piece of land to the defendant under an agree-
ment whereby the defendant was to pay a part of the purchase price to
the plaintiff, and. to assume payment of a sewer assessment which con-
stituted a lien against the land. The improvement was subsequently financed
in another way, and an ordinance was passed authorizing a refund of the
assessments paid and a cancellation of those unpaid. The plaintiff sued on
the contract for the amount of the cancelled assessment as part of the pur-
chase price with which the defendant had been intrusted as his agent.
The lower court gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed. Parker-Washington Co. v. Kansas City, U. S..
Daily, Nov. 17, 1928 at 8 (Fed. W. D. Ohio, 1928).
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When the purchaser of land assumes payment of an assessment for an
improvement in lieu of part of the purchase price, the vendor cannot re-
cover the amount of the assessment, later repealed, if the improvement is
abandoned. James v. Schmndt, 2 N. Y. Supp. 649 (City Ct. 1883); Milcr
v. Barler, 89 Tex. 264, 34 S. W. 601 (1896). Cnztra: Loztnsbzl,,j -e. Potter,
37 N. Y. Super. 57 (1874). When the assessment is later declared illegal
by a court, relief is denied the vendor, even though the purchaser receive3
the benefits of the improvement. This is based on an analogy to the situa-
tion where a court reverses a rule it has established by previous decisions.
vD . Blamstrom, 70 Ill. App. 62 (1897), aff'd on other grounds, 175 Ill.
435, 51 N. E. 755 (1898); cf. Tet-ncr v. Wudf, 93 Wash. 100, 10 Pac. 289
(1916). But if the assessment be legal and the purchaser acquires the
land with the benefit of the improvement, there would seem to be no valid
reason why he should be favored at the e.pense of the seller. Where a
third party, for a sufficient consideration, promises to assume another's
debt and the debt is subsequently satisfied by the creditor from the debtor's
assets, the third party should be responsible to the debtor for the amount
of the debt. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 1,1 (2). The
same result would seem to follow, perhaps on the basis of quasi-contract,
if the creditor-beneficiary chooses to withdraw his claim against the debtor.
See ibid. § 137 and comment (b) thereto. The court in the instant case
reasoned that the city had no personal claim against the plaintiff, merely
one against the land. But the assessment was made against the land while
it was owned by the plaintiff, and its effect was to deprive him of its
money value. It is obvious that, if the purchaser had paid the full sum
to the vendor, and the latter agreed to pay and had paid off the lien, he
would be entitled to a refund from the city. It seems scarcely equitable
to deny him relief because the parties chose what they considered merely
a different method of doing the same thing. The plaintiff's suit was based
solely on the theory that he could recover on the express contract. Even
if it were clear that he could not, an action in quasi-contract for unjust
enrichment might well be sustained. Where the facts of the instant eaze
were reversed and the purchaser was suing because the assessment which he
assumed was subsequently increased, a recovery of the difference has been
allowed in an action on the ex-press contract. Eveninzg Star Ledge No. Z.9
v. Robbins, 179 Iowa 537, 161 N. W. 6S0 (1917).
WLs-IHERImANCE OF ADOPTED CHIID UNDER LAPzrD LEGACY STATUTE.
-The testatrix was predeceased by a sister to whom she had devised and
bequeathed property. The adopted child of the sister claimed an interct
under a statute [N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (1916) § 29], which provides
that a devise or bequest to a testator's sister or certain other relatives shall
not lapse on the death of the legatee but shall vest in the legatc's sur-
viving child or other descendant as if the legatee had survived the tetator
and had died intestate. Held, that the legacy lapsed when the legatee
predeceased the testatrix, since an adopted child is not a "child" within
the statute. Matter of Martin's Will, 230 N. Y. Supp. 731 (Surr. Ct.
1928).
Adoption was unlnown to the conmon law and all rights which an
adopted child has are conferred by statute. See McN anara v. M acNizmra,
303 Ill. 196, 135 N. E. 410, 412 (1922). In general, as betwccn parent
and child, adoption statutes confer all the rights of lawfully torn children
on those adopted. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1920) § 8030; N. Y. Dori. RcL.
LAWS (1916) § 114; 2 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1920) § 1252; see Matter of
Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 260, 79 N. E. 991, 993 (1907); Bom-ze v. Dorncy,
184 App. Div. 476, 482, 171 N. Y. Supp. 264, 269 (2d Dep't 1918). But
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most courts have held that such statutes do not give the child the right
to inherit from the collateral kin of the adopting parent. Hopkins v. Hop-
kins, 202 App. Div. 606, 195 N. Y. Supp. 605 (4th Dep't 1922); In ro
Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. IV. 973 (1925). Contra: Dnton.
v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 Pac. 693 (1922). The view taken seems to
be that the relation established is personal to the foster parent and the
child. See Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 465, 98 S. W. 585, 587 (1906);
Kettell v. Baxter, 50 Misc. 428, 431, 100 N. Y. Supp. 529, 531 (Sup. Ct.
1906). In some states the interpretation given to the statute to prevent
iapse is that the bodily heir ol the predeceasing devisee takes directly from
the testator and not from the ancestor. See Mason v. Mason, 194 Iowa 504,
507, 188 N. W. 685, 686 (1922). It might be contended that under the view
of Hockaday v. Lynn, supra, an adopted child could not take directly from
the testator, and that the legacy should lapse in the instant case. Never-
theless, it would seem that since the New York Decedent Estate Law
specifically states that the bequest shall take effect as if the death of
the legatee occurred subsequent to that of the testator, that view is not
applicable. The instant decision is directly contra to that in In re Postors
Estate, 108 Misc. 604, 177 N. Y. Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
WILLS-REVOCATION BY OPERATION OF LAW-ArER-BoRN ILLEGITImATn
CHH.u-The testator publicly acknowledged the plaintiff as his illegitimate
son. After the former's death the plaintiff brought suit to set aside the
will, which had been made before his birth and contained no provision for
him. It was provided by statute that a will should be revoked if, after its
execution, "the testator shall have born to him legitimate issue;" and that
the acknowledgment of an illegitimate child made it an heir "to the same
extent as if such child had been legitimate." 1 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns,
1926) §§ 3457, 3333. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Hold,
on appeal, that the will was not revoked. Judgment affirmed. Eckart v.
Eckart, 163 N. E. 288 (Ind. 1928).
Statutes Irequently provide that a will is revoked wholly or pro tanto
by the birth of a child subsequent to the execution of the will. RooD, WILLS
(2d ed. 1926) § 382; Altizer, Subsequent Birth of Children as a Revocation
of a Will (1903) 9 VA. L. REG. 473. Whether the birth of an illegitimate
child has this effect depends on its status under the statutes of the partic-
ular state. In absence of a statute giving it rights, its birth will not
revoke a will. Irving v. Irving, 152 Ga. 174, 108 S. E. 540 (1921), 18 A.
L. R. 88 (1922). Where a statute provides that an illegitimate child may
inherit from its mother, its birth subsequent to the execution of the
mother's will has been held to revoke it. Patterson's Estate, 282 Pa. 396,
128 Atl. 100 (1925). Similarly, such a statute is to be construed in con-
nection with a statute providing for pretermitted children, so as to allow
an illegitimate child to share in the estate of a testatrix where no pro-
vision was made for it. Martin v. Claxton, 308 Mo. 314, 274 S. W. '7
(1925). Contra: Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray 535 (Mass. 1854). The same
is true as to a child pretermitted by the father, where public acknowledg-
ment has legitimized the child. Estate of Loyd, 170 Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522
(1915); Comment (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 158. Adoption of a child, under
statutes giving an adopted child the rights of an heir, generally revokes
a previous will, under an "after-born child" statute. Bourne v. Dorney, 184
App. Div. 476, 171 N. Y. Supp. 264 (2d Dep't 1918); see Kales, Rights of
Adopted Children (1914) 9 ITL. L. REV. 149, 154; cf. (1929) 38 YALM L.
J. 450. Contra: Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860 (1890). In
view of the analogies suggested, it would follow that the legitimation of
an after-born natural child should.revoke a will. Milburn v. Milburn, 60
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Iowa 411, 14 N. W. 204 (1882). But cf. Appeal of McCulloch, 113 Pa.
247, 6 Atl. 253 (1886) (legitimation of child born before Will does not make
it "after-born"). The court in the instant case, as in Davis v. Fo9lc, -upra,
was hampered by the unusual stipulation in its statute providing for rev-
ocation by the birth of "legitimate" issue. But the growing tendency to
protect the illegitimate child, especially by liberal construction of statu-
tory terms, such as "legitimate," "born," "child," in similar situations,
would seem to warrant a contrary decision. See Estate of Wardcly, 57
Cal. 484, 491 (1881) (natural child adopted by father is "legitimate");
cf. Matter of Del Genovese, 56 Misc. 418, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (Surr. Ct.
1907) (legitimation by marriage of parents revokes will as "marriage and
birth of lawful issue").
WORKiAN'S COMPENSATION-HERNIA-STATUTE REQUIRING InM)DIATE
INCAPAcrIT.-A Connecticut statute [Conn. Laws 1927, c. 307, § 4) pro-
vided that in order to be entitled to compensation for hernia the employee
must prove that it resulted from an accidental injury, and that inability to
work immediately followed. The plaintiff, during the course of his em-
ployment, suffered an injury which ultimately resulted in hernia, but
after the injury he worked for a week before he was incapacitated. The
commissioner dismissed his claim for compensation on the ground that
he was not "immediately" incapacitated. Held, on appeal (two judges di.-
senting), that the finding of the commissioner be affirmed. O'Bricn v. Wise
& Upson Co., 143 Atl. 155 (Conn. 1928).
Prior to the amendment of 1927 no provision concerning hernia appeared
in the Connecticut statutes. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5352. Con-
sequently, it was treated as any other injury arising out of and in the
course of employment. Cole v. Remington Arms Co., 3 Conn. Comp. 73
(4th Dist. 1918); Weimann v. Tuner & Seymo:r Mfg. Co., 5 Conn. Comp.
121 (5th Dist. 1922). And the courts and commissioners were lenient in
allowing compensation. Hartz v,. Hartford Faiene Co., 90 Conn. 539, 97
Atl. 1020 (1916) (compensation allowed for aggravation of pre-exizting
hernia); Thompson v. Towles, 5 Conn. Comp. 30 (5th Dist 1922) (com-
pensation allowed although employee was not incapacitated until nearly
sLx months later). An examination of the reported cases prior to the
amendment of 1927 shows that in over two-thirds of the claims awarding
compensation for hernia there was no immediate incapacitation. Conn.
Comp., Vols. 1-6 (1914-1926); cf. Beers, The 1927 ChangcG in the C'ozpcn-
sation Act (1928) 2 CONN. B. J. 78. Since hernia, unlike most other
injuries, is very difficult to trace to its cause, a number of statutes have
dealt with it specifically in order to prevent compensation for a hernia
which did not arise out of the employment. In effect they provide that in
order to be entitled to compensation for the injury, the claimant must prove
that the hernia was of recent origin; that it appeared suddenly, accom-
panied by pain, immediately following the accident; and that it did not
exist prior thereto. AA. Civ. CODE (1923) § 7551; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie,
1926) § 3154 (2); IDAHO COIP. STAT. (1919) § 6235; KY. STAT. (Carroll,
1922) § 4884; Mlo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 13609; Coup. Tx. STAT. (1923)
art. 8306, § 12 (b). New Jersey is the only state with a statute similar to
that of Connecticut. N. J. CoiaP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1924) c. 230, § 11;
Schultz v. Keystone Watch Co., 48 N. J. L. J. 104 (1925) (claim dismiszed
where there was not immediate cessation of work). While there is the
possibility under the other statutes that some claims for hernia may be
compensated which did not arise out of the employment, the Connecticut
and New Jersey statutes seem unduly strict in the e.tent to which thsy
go to obviate such danger.
